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Abstract
The Supreme Court Justices of the United States sit on the highest court of the land. The
justices have the ultimate say as to the meaning of the Constitution, and their role could aptly be
summarized as interpreters of the Constitution. They decide what the words of the nation’s
founding document mean and therefore help to determine the rule of law for the social, political,
and economic areas of society. To help them analyze the text of the Constitution and decide what
it means and subsequently apply it to cases, justices use constitutional methodologies.
Constitutional methodologies are algorithms or ways of thinking about provisions of the
Constitution that guide a justice’s reasoning and application of the Constitution to cases. These
different structured methods of analysis seem to be fair and objective ways of interpreting the
Constitution and deciding cases, yet this thesis argues the opposite.
The argument expounded in this thesis is that constitutional methodologies instead act as
smoke screens, a sort of constitutional camouflage, that allow a justice to decide a constitutional
question not according to some objective standard but rather by however they feel it should be
decided according to their beliefs and values. These methodologies use their theories, arguments,
and philosophies to legitimize interpreting the Constitution a certain way, but this thesis shows
that they inevitably lead a justice down a camouflaged path towards a single subjective decision.
Multiple justices using the same constitutional methodology to analyze the same constitutional
issue could come to different conclusions based on the values they hold and how they utilize the
methodology. This subjective decision hides behind the structured methods of analysis purported
by constitutional methodologies, and ultimately makes them more akin to smoke screens rather
than objective mechanisms for interpreting and applying the Constitution.
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Introduction
The United States was founded through a document that was just over 4,000 words, and
that document still guides and controls society today. The Constitution delineates what the three
different branches of the federal government can and cannot do, what the states can and cannot
do, and defines the structure for the above and much more. This document is over two centuries
old and remains the foundation upon which the United States is built. The Constitution still
controls the government and guides society, and it does this through the justices who sit on the
highest court in the land, the Supreme Court of the United States. The nine Supreme Court
Justices have the privilege to be the ultimate say with regards to the meaning of the Constitution.
The justices could more aptly be described as interpreters, rather than judges, as instead of
judgements they provide interpretations about how the nation’s founding document would decide
the case. To make these interpretations, justices all have algorithms for analyzing and deciding
constitutional issues. Some algorithms, more aptly described as methodologies, might not be as
pronounced or as structured as others but every justice has a certain method for how they view
the Constitution and how they rule on it. These are called constitutional methodologies: ways of
figuring out a particular meaning of a provision in the Constitution and how it applies in the
instant case.
At first glance, these methodologies seem to be vastly different from one another and
seem to be concrete and structured methods of analysis that tell a justice what to do in certain
cases; however, this thesis argues the opposite. Constitutional methodologies are instead used as
a sort of smoke screen: justices adhere to the principles of their preferred methodology which
makes their ultimate decision seem as if it comes from an objective place when in reality the
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methodology gives the justice the opportunity to impart their own beliefs to make their decisions.
Although certain methodologies may tend towards different sides of the political spectrum, they
all are quite similar in that they all provide the justice a cloak to decide the case according to
their own beliefs: each methodology leads the justice to a single subjective decision that then
provides them the opportunity to impart their own opinions into the case instead of legal
expertise. The justices can decide what the Constitution means, and therefore can rule the
country in a manner more akin to monarchs than judges of a democratic nation.
I do not introduce this argument in an effort to suggest that the nine justices who sit on
the Supreme Court at any one time are dictators of some sort; my intention is not that dramatic. I
am not arguing that justices actively attempt to impart their own will when deciding cases using
methodologies, nor do I assert that justices make poor decisions when applying methodologies.
Instead, my argument is that the methodologies they use conceal the fact that the methodologies
lead justices to a single subjective decision, and that justices are able to (or even that they must)
utilize their own personal ideals and values to make that decision. Justices are required to
interpret problems and interpret and apply the Constitution to those problems. Their opinions
ultimately shape how they make those interpretations as well as what a suitable or correct
interpretation might look like.
As with anything requiring interpretation, there are different viewpoints to the many
conflicts that arise regarding the Constitution and its meaning. Therefore, there is much theory
on many different sides, which attempts to explain the multiple ways of interpreting the
Constitution. This constitutional theory breeds various constitutional methodologies. The major
and most prominent of these methodologies discussed and dissected in this thesis are:
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Originalism, Living Constitutionalism, Political Process Theory, Pragmatism, and Moralism.
These methodologies all have their strengths and their flaws, and all could be considered
contradictory to all the others. J. Harvie Wilkinson put it best in his review of constitutional
methodologies entitled COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY when he said, “One might be tempted to
remark that a gathering of constitutional theorists resembles nothing so much as a circular firing
squad.”1 All of the theories are able to discredit and poke holes into other fellow theories. With
this being true, it follows that all these theories are therefore fallible. And because these theories
are being used by some of the most important individuals in the country to make some of the
most important decisions in the country, it would be reasonable to argue that there is no room for
fallibility.
It should be noted that the different ideas about jurisprudence and methods of applying
those ideas emerged long before the official creation and promotion of the methodologies
discussed in this thesis. While the focus here is on constitutional methodologies and how they act
as smoke screens in their application, the historical moorings of the theories these methodologies
are based on were present long before the inception of those methodologies.
The tenet of Originalism that justices should make their decisions based on the original
meaning of the text of the Constitution or the original intent of those who wrote it is as old as
American jurisprudence itself, as justices have been interpreting the Constitution’s text since the
Supreme Court was created. The idea in Living Constitutionalism that the Constitution should
act as a “living document” is one that can be seen as far back as the Marshall Court in the early
nineteenth century. Chief Justice John Marshall established judicial review, the power of the

1

J. Harvie Wilkinson, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 9 (2012).
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Court to decide on the constitutionality of laws and statutes and subsequently strike them down,
in Marbury v. Madison2 and this was not an explicit provision in the Constitution. Marshall even
describes in 1819 in McCulloch v. Maryland3 how the Constitution was created “to endure for
ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs.”4 Political
Process Theory was first championed by Professor John Hart Ely, but even before this justices
were making decisions based on the workings of political processes. This will be evidenced later
in the discussion of a Supreme Court case Trop v. Dulles 5 which employs the theories put forth
by Political Process Theory before the official inception of the methodology. Pragmatism and
Moralism are no different; justices have long focused on the future effect their rulings will have
as precedent (as proposed by Pragmatists), as well as focused on the moral principles of the
Constitution when interpreting it (as proposed by moralists). The focus in this thesis is on the
five constitutional methodologies described above, the most prominent figures who create and
promote them, and how these methodologies ultimately act as smoke screens to camouflage the
innate subjective decisions present in justices’ interpretations when using those methodologies,
but it is important to note that many of the ideas behind the theories promoted by these
methodologies had their emergence long before the rise of the methodologies.
Constitutional theory, and the methodologies it creates (which then influence the justices
of the Supreme Court), is incredibly important and has significant real-world effects. The
Supreme Court’s decisions determine how the citizens of the country live: whether women can

2

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
4
Id. at 415.
5
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
3

4

get abortions,6 whether a private business can refuse service based on a customer’s sexual
orientation,7 or whether it is constitutional to segregate black and white children in schools. 8
These decisions determine the rights of the people as well as the laws by which people live,
which emphasizes the importance of the theories and methodologies that affect those decisions.
The study and analysis of constitutional methodologies is so important because it gives an insight
into the most prominent ways of interpreting the Constitution, and how a justice might decide a
case.
Besides the importance of understanding the derivation of a justice’s ruling, and the
actual effects of said ruling, the study and analysis of constitutional methodologies is also
important in the search for the best (or most fair) ways of interpreting the Constitution. The
Constitution is in no way an easy document to understand, despite its short word count. Different
words and phrases mean different things to different interpreters, and this is evidenced by the
existence of multiple constitutional methodologies. Although theorists will always search, there
is no “correct” way of interpreting the Constitution. While one may favor a certain methodology
over another, and while one may believe that the methodology they favor is the correct one, the
methods are in fact all subjective. Whether a justice realizes it or not, their values and beliefs
direct them towards the methodology that best suits them. No matter what lies on the surface of
judicial decision-making at the highest level, whether it be claims to judicial restraint, a need to
protect the rights of the people from government intrusion, or something in between, underneath
it all lies a single subjective decision.

6

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
8
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
7

5

Important terms to define for the purposes of this thesis include “Founding Fathers” and
“Framers.” These terms will be used throughout in discussions of intent and interpretation of the
Constitution. They will be used according to an all-encompassing definition. It is hard to
delineate whom to include when discussing the Founding Fathers or the Framers of the
Constitution. Does one include only those delegates to the Constitutional Convention, who
physically drafted and wrote the Constitution? Or should one also include delegates to the state
ratification conventions, and other prominent figures at the time who affected the writing and
ratification of the Constitution? In this thesis, the terms Founding Father and Framer are used in
a general sense to refer to those who not only wrote the text of the Constitution but those
prominent thinkers at the time who inspired it, as well as those who inspired and argued for its
ratification. Further, the concepts of the “Founding Fathers” and “Framers” have changed over
time. Not only do they encompass a general scope of historical figures, but they evolve and
include different figures as time passes. These concepts can refer to those who originally drafted
the Constitution, as well as to those who drafted amendments that came many years later. A
discussion of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Due Process Clause may make reference to
“Framers”, but this would refer to the Framers of the amendment and not to the original Framers
of the Constitution, as they were no longer alive at the inception of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Discussion of Framers or Founding Fathers and their ideas or intent is historically contextualized
to account for the evolution of these groups over time.
This thesis argues that although the methodologies discussed have merit, they all
essentially act as a smoke screen allowing the justice to decide the case in favor of their own
personal guiding beliefs. This is not to say that every justice is actively using a methodology to
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impart their influence through each case for their own benefit. Rather, the argument in this thesis
is centered around the idea that all justices are able to do this, because the methodology they
utilize when deciding a case provides a sort of cover for them to decide each case how they want
to. These methodologies do not provide an objective algorithm for analyzing and deciding
complex legal issues, but instead lead the justice on a camouflaged path towards a single
subjective decision that lets the justice impart their own ideals into the case. This decision could
be whether the Constitution protects a certain right, whether it permits the Court to act, or
whether a certain word in the text means one thing or another. No matter what this decision is,
the justice can always answer whichever way they prefer using the methodology they support.
This single decision is different depending on the justice and their chosen method of
interpretation, but behind it all remains that one decision. So while different methodologies
purport to value certain things over others, whether it is judicial restraint in Originalism or
flexibility in Living Constitutionalism, they all lead the justice to a question which ultimately
allows the justice to decide whatever they want. No matter how structured a methodology is, the
justice is still led to this decision that is subjective based on the values of the justice and the
methodology they utilize.

7

Originalism

Preface to Originalism

Originalism is one of the most prominent constitutional methodologies. The method of
constitutional analysis offered by Originalism is that justices should not interpret the Constitution
themselves, but rather should look to the past to see what the Constitution meant when it was
written and when it was ratified. It argues that “the meaning of a constitutional provision was
fixed at the time it was enacted.”9
There are two main forms of Originalism that help define it further: original intent and
original meaning. “Original intent asserts that [the object of interpretation] is the intended
meaning of the Constitution’s enactors.”10 Proponents of original intent argue that any
interpretation should be based on what the authors of the Constitution intended it to mean; the
focus is on the Founding Fathers and their intents for what certain provisions would mean while
they were writing them. By focusing on how the Founding Fathers intended for the Constitution
to be interpreted and understood, it makes the task of simplifying the text of the Constitution
much more straightforward. It also helps create more of a standard when it comes to analyzing a
provision and applying it to a case. When using a different methodology, one could come to
multiple conclusions about one provision given the circumstances of the instant case and how the

9

John O. McGinnis and Michael B. Rappaport, Unifying Original Intent and Original Public Meaning, 113 Nw. U.
L. Rev. 1371, 1373 (2019).
10
John O. McGinnis and Michael B. Rappaport, Unifying Original Intent and Original Public Meaning, 113 Nw. U.
L. Rev. 1371, 1373 (2019).
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provision is being understood and applied. But when the only thing that matters for the
interpretation of that provision is what is meant by those who wrote it, the meaning can become
clearer and the application and use of it becomes more consistent throughout the years.
The other form of Originalism, original meaning, is similar to original intent in that they
both look to the past to see how the Constitution was understood and interpreted when it was
written. The difference between the two is who originalists look to in order to answer their
constitutional questions. Supporters of original intent look to what the Founding Fathers intended
the words to mean, but supporters of original meaning look to the people of the time as a whole
and how they understood the Constitution as they were ratifying it. Put simply by famed
originalist Robert Bork, “The judge must stick close to the text and the history, and their fair
implications, and not construct new rights.”11 This focus is a little more general, in the sense that
the emphasis is on the general meaning of the words employed to construct the Constitution
rather than the intent of the Founding Fathers. “Original…meaning posits that the object of
interpretation is the text as reasonably understood by a well-informed reader at the time of the
provision’s enactment.”12 An originalist who supports a reading of the Constitution based on
original meaning will use the basic understanding of the people of the time to construct their
analysis of a Constitutional provision. For example, if analyzing the First Amendment a justice
utilizing this methodology would look to what the people who ratified the Constitution thought
freedom of speech meant. What would the average citizen at that time think was meant by
“freedom of speech?” What did “freedom of speech” mean back then, what did those words

11

Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind. L.J. 1, 8 (1971).
John O. McGinnis and Michael B. Rappaport, Unifying Original Intent and Original Public Meaning, 113 Nw. U.
L. Rev. 1371, 1371 (2019).
12

9

mean and how did people understand them? These are the sort of questions that an originalist
might ask when trying to decipher the meaning of the text. This school of thought is very similar
to textualism, which is a facet of Originalism that advocates for using only the meaning of the
text when analyzing. The focus in this school of thought is that the literal definition of the words
in the text is the only thing that should be considered; not the intention of those wrote them or
ratified them but just what the words mean to those present today.
The proposed benefits of this school of thought are apparent: when comparing passages
of text to the intent of those who wrote them or the understanding of the text at the time, it can
provide an objective standard for interpretation. This also leads to one of the most highlighted
aspects of Originalism which is judicial restraint. Judicial restraint “is the notion that judges
ought to base their decisions on a source of authority that is outside of themselves and their
notions of the just.”13 Judicial restraint isn’t advocated anywhere stronger than in Originalism,
where the job of the justice is merely to discern what the words used to mean and not what they
should mean or what they or others want them to mean.

Originalism as Camouflage

The discussion of restraint is where the problems begin for Originalism and where the
argument that it is merely a smoke screen is derived. Wilkinson refers to Originalism as
“activism masquerading as restraint”14 and this is a very succinct description of the downfall of

13
14

Daniel Suhr, Does “Judicial Activist” Mean Something? (2008).
J. Harvie Wilkinson, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 33 (2012).
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this methodology. Originalism asks justices to do too much and to make too many subjective
decisions; it forces a justice to take on much responsibility that they might not want or likely
shouldn’t be attributed to them. Not only do the justices need to be outstanding legal scholars
and have a deep understanding of the Constitution and its application over the years, but utilizing
Originalism they must also analyze history that took place over 200 years ago to help make their
decisions. Originalism asks a justice to also be a historian, a political scientist, an etymologist,
and a sociologist in order to predict and understand what the citizens of the country meant over
200 years ago when the document was written. Justice Scalia admits as much in his musing on
Originalism: “But what is true is that it is often exceedingly difficult to plumb the original
understanding of an ancient text. Properly done, the task requires the consideration of an
enormous mass of material… Even beyond that, it requires an evaluation of the reliability of that
material… And further still, it requires immersing oneself in the political and intellectual
atmosphere of the time…It is, in short, a task sometimes better suited to the historian than the
lawyer.”15
Because Originalism requires a justice to do so much, there is a great deal of room to
maneuver when applying the methodology. A justice can pick and choose which historical
evidence from which historical figures to look at it and apply it to how they believe the case
should be decided, according not to how the Framers may have chosen to decide it but instead
how the justice wants it decided. As articulated by William Brennan, “our distance [from the
Framers who wrote the Constitution and those who ratified it] of two centuries cannot but work

15

Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 849, 856-857 (1989).
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as a prism refracting all that we see.” 16 This is where the subjective decision the justice must
make comes in. While it seems as though originalists are restraining themselves, they still must
make a decision that allows them to introduce their own beliefs into the analysis. A justice must
decide what historical context to look in, which Founding Father to listen to, or which definition
of a word from the 1700’s to adhere to. This is the “camouflaged path” that the methodology
provides. In his article on original intent, Derek H. Davis asserts that “the [F]ramers’ intentions
are not always easy to identify.”17 He goes on to describe the varying views and opinions of the
Framers of the Constitution, describing how “it has never been clear to what extent the
[F]ramers’ intentions are relevant to the task of establishing constitutional norms.”18 Some
Framers thought the Constitution should be interpreted based on the text and others thought it
should be on the intentions of those who ratified the Constitution.19 Still to this day the intentions
of the Framers are subject of controversy, so how could one expect an originalist justice to
discern an objective answer to a constitutional question when there isn’t an objective intent to
base that answer on?
Not only that, but how does one reconcile the differences between different courts as the
years go by? Many decisions that seem to be objective and seem to uphold the intentions of the
Framers of the Constitution contradict each other. In Plessy v. Ferguson20 the Court upheld the
separate but equal doctrine, but years later it was reversed by Brown v. Board of Education.21
Even originalists will agree that Plessy v. Ferguson was decided erroneously, but how does an

16

William J. Brennan, The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification, 4 (1985).
Derek H. Davis, Original Intent (2009).
18
Derek H. Davis, Original Intent (2009).
19
Derek H. Davis, Original Intent (2009).
20
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
21
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
17
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originalist reconcile that? They cannot. The United States was built with slavery being a major
facet of its construction, literally and ideologically. If the Fourteenth Amendment was
established in the time of the original Founding Fathers, they would likely not agree with its
application in Brown v. Board of Education. So how could an originalist rationalize the reversing
of that decision? Steven Calabresi attests in his essay On Originalism in Constitutional
Interpretation that originalists believe segregation was erroneously upheld in Plessy v. Ferguson
and that they believe “race discrimination will always be unconstitutional unless the Fourteenth
Amendment is repealed.”22 But, the decision in Plessy v. Ferguson would have been consistent
with a majority of the Founding Fathers at the time of the Constitution’s inception, as well as
with the majority of the public. If both cases can be looked at from an originalist point of view
and come to different answers, then clearly it does not provide an objective answer that is based
on the intentions of those from the eighteenth century.
The Constitution is around 4,000 words which is incredibly brief for a document meant to
guide a country for years to come. This brevity is likely because the Framers could not possibly
include answers and solutions to every single constitutional question and problem that may arise
over hundreds of years. Therefore, originalist justices are left with the task of deciding what the
Framers intended. Going back to the example of freedom of speech guaranteed by the First
Amendment can provide myriad problematic questions that a justice would have to answer. What
sort of acts are guaranteed free speech? Are there certain acts that should never be considered
under free speech? Are there certain circumstances that could result in free speech being taken
away? Does free speech refer to just words being spoken, or can it include written words and

22

Steven G. Calabresi, On Originalism in Constitutional Interpretation.
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nonverbal acts of communication? These sorts of questions do not have easy answers, and while
the justice has precedent on which to rely, precedent only goes so far and only helps so much.
The justice must then decide how they think the Framers would have decided an issue or what
they would have thought. There is only so much historical evidence that chronicles the
arguments and beliefs of the Framers at that time, which means the justice must fill in the gaps
with their own opinions on how someone like James Madison or Thomas Jefferson would
interpret a constitutional clause.
Potentially without even realizing it, an originalist justice will impart their own beliefs
and values when deciding how to interpret what a framer might think or how they might believe
something should be applied. A justice’s views on free speech would affect how they might
interpret the Framers’ views on free speech. People’s personal values and ideologies provide a
filter for viewing the world: different people see different things as good or bad, helpful or
harmful, proper or improper. Everyone has different life experiences which help form their
personalities, beliefs, and who they are as a person. Everyone is at least a little different, which
means that two people could look at the same piece of historical evidence and interpret it
differently. Therefore, a justice will view a constitutional question their own way and
subsequently view historical evidence and the views of the Framers or original citizens of the
country their own way. Richard Posner aptly describes this in stating how “Originalism…is not
an analytic, but a rhetoric that can be used to support any result the judge wants to reach.”23 The
“rhetoric” of the methodology allows a path that acts as a smoke screen. This path leads to the
originalist justice being able to advance their own beliefs into what they claim is a practice of

23

Richard A. Posner, Bork and Beethoven, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 1365, 1378 (1990).
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judicial restraint, and this path is camouflaged by the values and methods professed by
Originalism.
Originalism in Action

An excellent example of Originalism in action can be found in District of Columbia v.
Heller.24 This landmark Supreme Court case involved a D.C. law that restricted the licensing of
handguns and compelled those who had licensed handguns in their home to keep the handguns
nonfunctional. Written by Justice Scalia, the majority opinion declared the law unconstitutional
on the grounds that it violated the Second Amendment. The opinion is an accurate representation
of the method of constitutional analysis proposed by Originalism. It begins with a focus on the
clauses of the amendment and the specific words being used, and discusses their definitions and
meanings. The opinion then turns to a commentary on the various interpretations of the
amendment by “founding-era legal scholars”25 as well as case law from before and after the civil
war, focusing on the understanding of the amendment from those time periods. Then the opinion
turns to the case at hand and applies its previous analysis of history.
Not only does this case accurately represent an originalist way of analyzing and applying
a provision of the Constitution, but it also displays how Originalism acts as a smokescreen to
hide the subjective decisions of justices. The opinion works to stick close to the text of the
Constitution and to the history of its understanding and application. Scalia discusses meanings of
words, their use in forming sentences, and what those sentences ultimately mean. One section of

24
25

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
Id. at 605.
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the opinion starts out with “Before addressing the verbs ‘keep’ and ‘bear,’ we interpret their
object: ‘Arms.,’26 which show a commitment to the text itself and the meaning of the words.
Twenty-nine of the first pages of the opinion are devoted almost entirely to the analysis of
sentence structure and the understanding and application of the Second Amendment throughout
history.27 However, even with this supposed commitment to the past, the decision requires the
justices to make a subjective decision in how to apply past meanings. While the opinion used
considerable historical evidence to establish that “the inherent right of self-defense has been
central to the Second Amendment right,”28 the use of Originalism still requires Scalia and the
other joining justices to make a subjective decision on how history should be applied in the case.
The methodology continues to act as a smoke screen by hiding the subjective decisions of how
the past should be reconciled with the future behind claims to judicial restraint and adherence to
the text.

26

Id. at 581.
Id. at 576-604.
28
Id. at 628.
27
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Living Constitutionalism

Preface to Living Constitutionalism

Originalism is one of the two largest-looming constitutional methodologies, and the
second is Living Constitutionalism. Perhaps because it is essentially the exact opposite of
Originalism, it also been quite influential in the judicial history of the nation. This is exemplified
by the era of the Warren Court. As described by Morton Horwitz, “from 1953, when Earl Warren
became Chief Justice, to 1969, when Earl Warren stepped down as Chief Justice, a constitutional
revolution occurred.”29 This revolution led to not only many landmark Supreme Court cases, but
also the emergence of new accepted ways of interpreting the Constitution, and this was thanks to
“the idea of a living constitution: a constitution that evolves according to changing values and
circumstances.”30
The basic principle behind Living Constitutionalism can be ascertained from the name of
the methodology itself: it claims the Constitution should be a “living document.” Proponents of
this methodology believe that the Constitution should be flexible enough so that it can grow and
evolve with society. One such proponent was Justice William Brennan, who when describing the
Constitution said that “[l]ike every text worth reading, it is not crystalline. The phrasing is broad
and the limitations of its provisions are not clearly marked. Its majestic generalities and
ennobling pronouncements are both luminous and obscure. This ambiguity of course calls forth

29
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Morton J. Horwitz, The Warren Court and The Pursuit of Justice, 50 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 5, 5 (1993).
Morton J. Horwitz, The Warren Court and The Pursuit of Justice, 50 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 5, 5 (1993).

17

interpretation, the interaction of reader and text.”31 While Originalism asks what the words of the
Constitution meant back when it was written, Living Constitutionalism asks, “what do the words
of the text mean in our time?”32 This establishes an inherent flexibility in the text for living
constitutionalists. This flexibility is manifested in new interpretations and understanding of
provisions of the Constitution, which are introduced via judgements of the Supreme Court.
As society grows and changes, so do the attitudes and beliefs of people, as well as what is
acceptable and not acceptable. Slavery is an excellent example of this. Slavery was common
practice in the early nineteenth century up until the civil war and the ratification of the Thirteenth
and Fourteenth Amendments. After that slavery became a thing of the past, but segregation was
still a very prevalent practice and racist attitudes were common (if not expected). In the second
half of the twentieth century the emergence of the Civil Rights movement led to the end of
widespread segregation and led to increased equality for people of color who had long been
disenfranchised and looked down upon. However, even then racist attitudes and practices were
still common everywhere from the government to businesses, schools, and public places.
Fortunately, today’s society is at a place where things are more equal than ever, and these racist
attitudes and practices are less prevalent than they have ever been (although they undoubtedly
are still present in certain forms). What was acceptable and typical at one time can become
unacceptable and rare in another, and this is evidence of societal conventions changing.
Along with the changes in attitudes, beliefs, and practices, meanings also change over
time. Definitions, rationales, and interpretations all change with society. The concept of equality
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is a great example of this. As demonstrated in the above example of slavery, equality, what it
means, and how it is implemented in society has clearly had drastic changes since the foundation
of the country. When the Constitution was being written equality referred mainly to equality
between white men and still excluded all others, whereas today equality is closer to
encapsulating all people everywhere. So, not only do attitudes and beliefs change but also the
meaning of certain ideals and concepts change with society, and this leads supporters of Living
Constitutionalism to advocate for a living document.
As mentioned in the previous section on Originalism, the Constitution is not a very long
document, and it also is quite general. Instead of going into detail on the certain rights
guaranteed to American citizens and the different abilities and responsibilities of different
governmental institutions, the nation’s founding document instead provides a broad outline and
structure for the government. The detail of the text is important, but what is equally important is
the framework it sets up for the future. This is perhaps best emphasized by David Strauss in THE
LIVING CONSTITUTION when he issues readers the challenge to look at any random case opinion
from the Supreme Court and analyze the reasoning of how the justices came to their decision. He
argues that “the text of the Constitution will play, at most, a ceremonial role” and that “most of
the real work will be done by the Court’s analysis of its previous decisions.” He then goes on to
explain that “[w]here the precedents leave off, or are unclear or ambiguous, the opinion will
make arguments about fairness or good policy: why one result makes more sense than another,
why a different ruling would be harmful to some important social interest.”33 This explanation of
how the text of the Constitution is not enough points out that justices need to and will use current
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beliefs and understandings to make their argument and further explain their reasoning behind
citing a passage of the Constitution.

Living Constitutionalism as Camouflage

The virtues of this methodology are readily apparent: under this theory the Constitution
can change with society. No longer would people be chained to the past by a document that is
over 200 years old, but rather they can use that same document and its underlying principles as a
guide even while applications change over time. However, with these benefits come even greater
problems that could potentially be detrimental to the balance between different governmental
institutions and the role of justices on the Supreme Court. While greater flexibility is favorable
because flexibility allows justices to better apply the Constitution as society changes and
evolves, it also inevitably provides them with too much room to inflict their own beliefs in a way
that changes the Constitution itself. The ability for living constitutionalists to “change” the
Constitution enables them to essentially create the law instead of interpreting it. As Strauss
describes it, “a living constitution is, surely, a manipulable constitution. If the Constitution is not
constant—if it changes from time to time—then someone is changing it. And that someone is
changing it according to his or her own ideas about what the Constitution should look like.”34 By
allowing for such broad interpretation of the text, justices can argue for increasing or decreasing
the reach of certain rights or even create new ones altogether.
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This is perhaps best exemplified in substantive due process cases such as Roe v. Wade.35
Arguably one of the most famous Supreme Court cases, Roe v. Wade helped establish an official
right to abortion and provided abortion regulations. This decision has been very controversial
and is still debated today, both politically by people advocating for or against abortion and
legally by legal scholars. The reasoning of the Court in Roe v. Wade was based on a newfound
“right to privacy.” This right to privacy had its original inception in Griswold v. Connecticut.36
This case dealt with a married couple’s right to use contraception and receive counseling on
contraception from medical professionals, and whether the Constitution protected their marital
privacy. The Court decided the Constitution did protect this right. It reasoned that “specific
guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras,”37 and that these penumbras create “zones of
privacy.”38 The case was the basis for the foundation of the right to privacy, and the Court in Roe
v. Wade used the case to confirm that this right to privacy exists and subsequently apply it to the
contested right to abortion.
This right to privacy was not an explicitly stated right in the Bill of Rights, nor was it
well-established through precedent and consistent interpretation of a provision of the
Constitution. Instead, the Court fashioned this right from the penumbras of other rights
guaranteed by other provisions of the Constitutions, namely the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.
Regardless of one’s stance on abortion, from a legal and constitutional point of view this
fashioning of a new right is not a good thing. Not only is the Court interpreting the Constitution
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very broadly in Griswold v. Connecticut and Roe v. Wade, but the justices go on to create a new
right that was not present before based simply off stretched logic regarding other established
rights. The Court even went on in Roe v. Wade to establish guidelines for different trimesters of a
woman’s pregnancy.39 While it is not abnormal for courts to set forth guidelines for future
situations and cases, these were not so much legal standards as they were new laws. The Court
essentially turned its written opinion into a statute; they abandoned their role as interpreters and
went further to take the place of legislators.
This case is just one example of how Living Constitutionalism leads justices down a
camouflaged path towards judicial activism. Judicial activism is often mentioned as the major
weakness of Living Constitutionalism. The opposite of judicial restraint, judicial activism is what
a justice partakes in when they allow their own beliefs to affect their decision-making and move
closer towards creating law rather than interpreting it. Citing Black’s Law Dictionary in his
article Judicial Activism: A Tempest or a Tempest in a Teapot?, Mark Franek defines judicial
activism as “a philosophy of judicial decision-making whereby judges allow their personal views
about public policy, among other factors, to guide their decisions, usually with the suggestion
that adherents of this philosophy tend to find constitutional violations and are willing to ignore
precedent.”40 Most methodologies and judges in general tend to avoid judicial activism, and
appearing to stray too far from their seat on the bench and into a legislator’s seat. The phrase
“activist judge” comes with a negative connotation, and a judge may consider it an insult since it
means that a judge is overstepping their role and their given jurisdiction. Judicial activism is
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normally something a justice should avoid, and if Living Constitutionalism as a methodology can
be thought of as a body then judicial activism is the cancer that plagues it.
The opportunity for a justice to stray from a form of objective and passive interpretation
is much clearer in Living Constitutionalism than in Originalism: judicial activism allows justices
to make subjective decisions according to their own beliefs and then transform those beliefs
virtually into law. Living constitutionalists make subjective decisions all the time, and these
decisions are camouflaged by Living Constitutionalism’s advocacy for a living document. The
methodology purports that the Constitution needs to change and evolve with society, but
ultimately it is not society that is determining this change in the Constitution, but rather it is the
living constitutionalist justices who determine that change. Their decisions are camouflaged by
Living Constitutionalism’s argument that the Constitution should be malleable. Through
subscribing to and using this methodology, living constitutionalist justices are able to make
decisions that ultimately end with them fashioning or removing rights, protections, or
responsibilities in a manner more akin to a legislator. In this way, Living Constitutionalism acts
as the smoke screen for these decisions to be made, and these decisions are, therefore, always
subjective and appear to be made according to what that justice believes to be right and the
values that they hold.

Living Constitutionalism in Action
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An example of Living Constitutionalism in action is present within Lochner v. New
York.41 This case from the start of the twentieth century dealt with a New York statute which put
limits on how many hours a week bakers could work. The Court reasoned that the statute was
unconstitutional as it violated a "liberty of contract" 42 which they found was protected by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The majority opinion stated that “the general
right to make a contract in relation to his business is part of the liberty of the individual protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution.” 43 This prime example of Living
Constitutionalism highlights how justices are able to fashion or declare new rights out of
different provisions of the Constitution as they see fit to meet the evolving standards of society.
This case is also a prime example of the way in which Living Constitutionalism can act
as a smoke screen to allow justices to decide a case based on their own personal opinions or
values. By treating the Constitution as a living document, the justice is able to declare what the
words of the Constitution mean in our time and how they should be interpreted to fit what the
justice believes to be how society views the issue at hand. In this case, the majority expanded the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to include a right to contract which is not
explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, nor was it explicitly established through multiple
applications in precedent. This trend followed the Court throughout the twentieth century, as the
underlying philosophy of Lochner v. New York can be seen in cases that helped to establish the
“right to privacy” such as Griswold v. Connecticut44 and Roe v. Wade.45 All three of these cases
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are examples of Living Constitutionalism providing justices camouflage to discover rights out of
provisions of the Constitution that were not previously there, and this camouflage hides the
subjective decisions the justices make to ultimately fashion those rights.

25

Political Process Theory

Preface to Political Process Theory

An alternative to Originalism and Living Constitutionalism, Political Process Theory is a
different type of constitutional methodology that focuses on political processes rather than
substantive rights. In DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW, Professor John
Hart Ely introduces this alternative theory for interpreting the Constitution. He asserts that “the
original Constitution was principally… dedicated to concerns of process and structure and not to
the identification and preservation of specific substantive values.” 46 In introducing this
methodology, his focus is on the processes by which the government functions and not the rights
others so often focus on when thinking of the Constitution. In comparing political theory to
economic markets, Ely highlights how antitrust and regulatory economic orientations intervene
when the market fails or “dictate substantive results” respectively, and how in the case of politics
and constitutional theory justices should adhere more to the “antitrust” practices and intervene
only when the “political market…is systematically malfunctioning.”47
Political Process Theory argues that the courts should only intervene and act when the
“process” is interrupted. With this methodology the question the justice is asking should not be
what they should decide, but rather if they may decide.48 Ely alleges “judges should simply stop
scrutinizing the substantive outcomes of the legislative process and instead focus solely on the

46

John Hart Ely, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 92 (1980).
John Hart Ely, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 102-103 (1980).
48
J. Harvie Wilkinson, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 61 (2012).
47

26

process itself, invalidating laws that clog the arteries of political change or discriminate against
minorities without enough political clout to make their voices heard.”49
The example of Roe v. Wade50 can be used once again in the discussion of Political
Process Theory. A proponent of Political Process Theory would likely come to an opposite
conclusion than the one the Court did in that case. While that decision was an example of Living
Constitutionalism at work, if the theories of Political Process Theory were instead substituted,
likely no “right to privacy” would be found to legitimate a right to abortion. A justice utilizing
Political Process Theory would likely come to the decision that because no right to abortion
exists, the “process” is not broken and there is no right being infringed upon. The justice using
Political Process Theory would not create this right and subsequently apply the right, as the
Court originally did in Roe v. Wade, but rather would recognize that creating rights is the job of
the legislature through statutes or the public through amendments, and until that happens there is
no right that could cause the political process to be broken suggesting that the Court should
intervene.
John Hart Ely speaks further on this matter in The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on
Roe v. Wade.51 He expresses how “the interests to which the Court can responsibly give
extraordinary constitutional protection include not only those expressed in the Constitution but
also those that are unlikely to receive adequate consideration in the political process, specifically
the interests of ‘discrete and insular minorities’ unable to form effective political alliances.”52
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This concept of discrete and insular minorities comes from the famed “Footnote Four” of United
States v. Carolene Products Company,53 in which the Court discusses prejudice against discrete
and insular minorities and how this can affect the Court’s process in making decisions on
constitutionality. This footnote is where Ely derives his conception and application of “discrete
and insular minority.” This was the foundation for Ely’s application of this concept in his
thoughts on Roe v. Wade described above, as well as the foundation for some of the standards
and theory proposed by Political Process Theory. Footnote Four indicated how the Court would
“continue to apply a form of heightened scrutiny in situations in which a law or statute conflicts
with Bill of Rights protections, where the political process has closed or is malfunctioning, and
when regulations adversely affect discrete and insular minorities.” 54
This fitting description of the type of judicial action stressed by Political Process Theory
supports Ely’s claim that Roe v. Wade “is not an appropriate case” for the delineation and
protection of any discrete and insular minorities.55 Ely goes further to describe how Political
Process Theory argues that the Court should use their influence to assist “a minority demanding
in court more than it was able to achieve politically”, and that unborn fetuses in the context of
Roe v. Wade have never constituted a discrete and insular minority in need of protection from a
broken political process.56
Political Process Theory is another constitutional methodology that advocates judicial
restraint. Wilkinson articulates the “seductive promise” of Political Process Theory as
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introducing a “theory of constitutional interpretation that is equally a theory of judicial
restraint.”57 Similar to the way originalists believe a justice’s role is not to create law and that
they should only step in to interpret unclear laws and answer constitutional questions, supporters
of Political Process Theory believe that a justice should only be involved if the processes by
which democracy flows are malfunctioning. These supporters argue that justices should not
create or clarify the rights that are already present in the Constitution, but rather should only step
in when those rights are being infringed upon: when the system that guarantees and protects
them is no longer working to do that. On the topic of judicial restraint from the point of view of
Political Process Theory, Wilkinson states that “[j]udges, like all citizens, are entitled to their
beliefs, but when they freely substitute those beliefs for the will of the people, they endanger the
central tenets of our democracy.”58

Political Process Theory as Camouflage

Political Process Theory still falls victim to the need for a justice to make a subjective
decision and inevitably acts as a smoke screen to camouflage that decision using judicial
restraint. This decision is not what the text of the Constitution would mean in the past, or how it
should be read in the present, but rather whether the process is broken. Although it seems to
provide a clear answer for when to intervene, what constitutes a broken process is a difficult
question to answer. A justice still must use their own discretion, informed by their own beliefs
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and values, to make a subjective decision as to whether the process is broken and intervention is
needed. Similar, what constitutes a “discrete and insular minority”59 is a question that justices
could potentially have different opinions on given their own personal beliefs. In judging political
processes, political attitudes are bound to intervene.
Further, only intervening when the process is broken assumes that most of the time the
process is not broken. One could argue that throughout history the process has never not been
broken. The political processes created in the Constitution and by the Founding Fathers were
created for straight white men, by straight white men. The process never accounted for many
minority groups, and allowed the discrimination of them and the denial of their inalienable
rights. Even today the political processes of the nation do not work for everyone and are still
tailored to serve certain people more than others. So, who is to say when the process is broken?
How could Political Process Theory be rationalized when the process is always broken?
No political processes will be perfect and there will always be some sort of malfunction,
but the decision as to whether the process is broken is a subjective one based on the notions of
the justice. By promoting judicial restraint and a focus on process rather than substantive rights,
Political Process Theory camouflages this path to a subjective decision that ultimately puts the
state of a political process in the hands of a justice, and as previously argued they will make that
decision according to the ideals, beliefs, and values they hold that affect how they see the world.

Political Process Theory in Action
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Trop v. Dulles60 is an excellent example of Political Process Theory being applied.
Although this case took place before John Hart Ely’s conception of Political Process Theory, it is
an example of how a justice might focus on a political process and whether it is not functioning
properly when they are tasked with deciding a case. This case involved a United States Army
private who was put in confinement following a disciplinary violation, from which he escaped.
He then turned himself back in and decided to return, but was later still convicted of desertion
and was dishonorably discharged. Years later he applied for a passport but was denied on the
grounds that “he had lost his citizenship by reason of his conviction and dishonorable discharge
for wartime desertion.”61 The Court then decided that his forceful expatriation was considered
cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment, and deemed it unconstitutional.
In Trop v. Dulles, the Court focused on the process of expatriation. Expatriation is the
process of losing one’s citizenship, and the Court found that the way this process took place in
that case was malfunctioning. The process in which Trop lost his citizenship was broken in the
eyes of the Court, but this is another example of how constitutional methodologies act as smoke
screens. The justices themselves had to decide whether this process of expatriation was broken,
and this was inevitably affected by the lens in which they view the world (and therefore the cases
which come before them). Focusing on process when deciding a case, in the way Political
Process Theory argues one should, hides the ability of the justice to actually decide the case
according to their own values. A justice focusing on process could define the process in
whichever way they need to fit their beliefs, and could then determine whether they think the
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process is functioning properly according to how they personally believe it should function, all
under the guise of Political Process Theory.

32

Pragmatism

Preface to Pragmatism

One other alternative to the constitutional arguments of Originalism and Living
Constitutionalism is Pragmatism. While Originalism looks to the past and Living
Constitutionalism looks to the present, Pragmatism instead looks to the future. The main ideal
behind this methodology is that justices should consider the effect that their ruling will have.
Pragmatism furthers that these effects should guide the rulings themselves. One of the most
prominent supporters of Pragmatism, Richard Posner, describes this theory as one that focuses
on the “task of exploring the operation and consequences of constitutionalism.”62 He describes
how a pragmatic decision to a case contains a “consideration of systemic and not just casespecific consequences.”63 This methodology takes a more realistic rather than theoretical look at
the cases the Supreme Court decides; rather than focusing solely on constitutional theory and
interpreting the text, pragmatists instead look to see what effects their rulings would have in the
real world.
In Brandon Murrill’s essay Modes of Constitutional Interpretation, he offers another
definition: “pragmatist approaches often involve the Court weighing or balancing the probable
practical consequences of one interpretation of the Constitution against other interpretations.”64
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The Roe v. Wade65 example can again be used to further explain the meaning and the tenets of
Pragmatism. That case started with the right of “Jane Roe” to have an abortion, but it was about
much more. Instead, it became about the right to privacy and the right to abortion. A pragmatist’s
approach will not focus solely on the text of the Constitution, or the political process involved
with getting an abortion, but rather will analyze those interpretations and more to then determine
and compare future consequences. So, if a pragmatist was deciding Roe v. Wade, they would
look at potential implications that enforcing or not enforcing a right to privacy and a right to
abortion would have for all women in the present and the future, as well as the implications that
acknowledging such a right would have on future cases. If a pragmatist decided the case
following the establishment of the right to privacy, they would have taken into account the
ramifications that finding a right to privacy would have on future cases as a precedent: not only
how the right to privacy would be used in future but also how future justices might use the
creation of that right to justify creating others in the future.
Wilkinson provides another succinct description when he characterizes Pragmatism as
“activism through antitheory.”66 Pragmatism is characterized by judicial activism in the same
way that Living Constitutionalism is. However, Pragmatism operates from an anti-theory
perspective. Instead of advocating for one theory or another, this methodology outright dismisses
them and encourages justices to focus on the effects that their decisions have. “Legal pragmatism
is hostile to the idea of using abstract moral and political theory to guide judicial decision
making.”67 Instead, pragmatists prefer to bring their judicial decision making outside the realm
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of theory and into the real world, where its application can be studied and its effects for the
future determined. “Legal pragmatism is forward-looking, regarding adherence to past decisions
as a (qualified) necessity rather than as an ethical duty.”68 Pragmatists do not emphasize the
importance of the Constitution in making decisions as much as originalists might; they instead
claim that looking to the future and the effects their rulings would have is better. The rigidity of
the Constitution can be considered a restriction that may leave society with no suitable solutions
for the future; pragmatists seek to avoid the “pitfalls of rigidity.”69

Pragmatism as Camouflage

Even though pragmatists admit they are not necessarily adhering to the Constitution or
any particular constitutional theory, their chosen methodology still acts as a camouflage to
disguise their decisions. While pragmatists claim to make rulings based on the impacts the
decisions will have in the future, a subjective decision still needs to be made as to what effect
that ruling will have in the future. A justice still must decide how their ruling will impact the
future and what they should do about it, and what effects resulting from those impacts are
preferable. Wilkinson describes how “Pragmatism itself does not supply the metric for
determining which results are the best results—the individual judge does…”70 A justice’s
attitudes towards the constitutional situation will still affect how they view it, and consequently
will affect how they interpret that situation and how it will play out in the future. As previously
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mentioned, people’s views and ideals shape the way they analyze the world around them, and
this filter is unavoidable. Therefore, a justice’s personal views and ideals will still be present in
any pragmatic decision, and the idea that a pragmatist is merely focusing on the future to help
guide their rulings just acts as camouflage for that fact.

Pragmatism in Action

NLRB v. Canning71 is a great example of Pragmatism in action. This case started with
Noel Canning and its employee labor union coming to an agreement which Noel Canning argued
was not binding. The union alleged these actions amounted to unfair labor practices and filed a
complaint with the National Labor Relations Board. The NLRB decided in favor of the union
which led Noel Canning to appeal the decision on the grounds that two of the three members of
the panel who decided the case were not confirmed by the Senate and were only appointed by
President Obama. However, the Recess Appointments Clause gives the president the power to
make appointments to fill vacancies which occur while Congress is in recess. The Court in this
case had to decide whether Congress was officially in recess when those appointments were
made, as well as if the Recess Appointments Clause only gives the president power to fill those
vacancies which occur during an official recess of Congress.
Seeing as this case deals with the power of the president to make official appointments,
the Court took a pragmatic approach to deciding this case. Clearly, such a case would have
lasting effects on the appointment powers of the president, so the Court focused on those effects
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and on the future. The opinion stated that “the Court…must hesitate to upset the compromises
and working arrangements that the elected branches of Government themselves have reached.” 72
The Court focused on the effects that their decision would have in an attempt to preserve the
checks and balances on the president’s power. The justices determined that the clause of the
Recess Appointments Clause “should be interpreted as granting the President the power to make
appointments during a recess but not offering the President the authority routinely to avoid the
need for Senate confirmation.”73 The Court made clear what exactly the powers of the president
are, without affording the president any additional powers in order to preserve the checks and
balances in place.
This case is an example of how Pragmatism can act as a smoke screen for justices using
this methodology to make their constitutional decisions. The justice has the opportunity to decide
for themselves the effects their decision will have in the future, and whether those effects are
preferable. In this case the justices had to determine whether their decision would give the
president the power to avoid the need for Senate confirmation of appointees. Pragmatism as a
methodology provides camouflage for a justice to make these subjective decisions about the
future and subsequently decide the case at hand based on those subjective decisions, which are
inevitably informed by the justice’s personal opinions on the situation and how it should be
handled.
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Moralism

Preface to Moralism

Moralism, also sometimes called the moral reading, 74 is a constitutional methodology
which focuses on morality when analyzing the Constitution. Moralism suggests that justices
should focus on the moral aspect of constitutional principles and ideals. It argues that many
constitutional provisions recognize or utilize a moral principle in their construction, and that
when deciding a case that brings such a provision into question or under analysis a justice must
decide what said moral principle includes and permits. Ronald Dworkin describes the
methodology by saying: “[t]he moral reading proposes that we…interpret and apply these
abstract clauses on the understanding that they invoke moral principles about political decency
and justice.”75
Daniel Lambright, through a discussion on moral philosophy, natural theory, and “the
incorporation of these philosophical insights on morality and human nature into the United States
Constitution,”76 argues that morality and moral philosophy are engrained throughout the
Constitution. A moralist would then prefer to analyze the Constitution and deal with
constitutional questions not based strictly on the text or on abstract legal theory, but rather on
moral philosophy and principles. The First Amendment is based on the moral idea that people
should be free to speak their mind and express their beliefs, the Fourth Amendment is based on
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the moral belief that people’s privacy cannot be invaded without proper and official legal cause,
and multiple amendments involve the moral concept that one should be tried in court in a fair
trial by one’s peers. Much of the Constitution and the rights it guarantees come from the moral
ideals the original American colonists had that were kept from them by the British crown before
the Revolutionary War. Morality is engrained throughout the Constitution, so it is reasonable to
focus on the morality of certain provisions when making decisions about them.

Moralism as Camouflage

Although Moralism attempts to focus on the morals of society and the nation, it instead
provides a justice the cover to only apply their own moral beliefs and understandings. Perhaps
more than any other concept discussed so far, morality is subjective. Some people interpret and
understand morality and moral principles differently than others. One person could believe an
action is right while another could believe it is wrong. This is exemplified by controversial topics
such as the right to abortion. This right is founded on the moral idea that a woman should have
control of her body and have the right to choose how to handle her pregnancy. Yet, abortion is a
heavily debated and contentious political topic of the day, and a moral reading of a constitutional
question involving abortion will not lead any justice to a simple or objective answer. And, in
using that moral reading, the justice will inevitably involve personal beliefs and values
concerning the moral topic at hand. They will have reached a conclusion about the moral
principle in question based in part on their own morality, whether they are aware of it or not. The
camouflage that Moralism as a constitutional methodology provides is therefore quite apparent.
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Those who support a moral reading champion a focus on the morality of the Constitution and the
rights and principles it encapsulates. However, this approach to analyzing the Constitution
merely veils the subjective decisions that a justice must make based on their own moral code. By
hiding behind Moralism’s emphasis on virtue and morality, moralists are able to impose their
own ideals into the constitutional question at hand and ultimately into the ruling itself.

Moralism in Action

While not explicitly stated to be an opinion based on Moralism, it can be argued that
Brown v. Board of Education 77 utilized a moral reading of the Constitution and the case at hand.
The decision in this landmark case was based on the moral principle of equality. The unanimous
decision stated that “in the field of public education the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no
place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.”78 While the ultimate decision in the
case is founded on the Fourteenth Amendment, the opinion itself puts great focus on equality,
more pointedly the inequality that African-American children were facing in public education.
The decision in this case was based on equality as a moral issue and used the Fourteenth
Amendment to affirm that decision.
The way in which Moralism acts as a smoke screen for the justices who use it can be seen
even in Brown v. Board of Education. Using moral concepts as a guide for making decisions
requires a justice to understand those moral concepts, which will vary from person to person, as
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morality is a subjective concept. Different people view morality in different ways, and the lens in
which a justice views a case and views the world will invariably have an impact on how they
understand and make decisions based on moral concepts. Moralism, therefore, informs the
subjective decisions made regarding moral concepts, what is right and what is wrong, and related
applications. Whether inequality is present is a subjective decision in that every justice could
arrive at a different definition and understanding of inequality, and equality is a moral concept
that is inherently subjective. These are the subjective decisions that Moralism acts as a smoke
screen to hide.
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Conclusion
In COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY, Wilkinson paraphrases Winston Churchill
expressing that “Originalism is the worst constitutional theory except for all the others.” 79 He
also describes how Justice Scalia refers to Originalism as “the lesser evil.”80 The hopelessness
present in the search for the correct constitutional methodology is not lost on the justices who
utilize these methodologies and the scholars who study them. The purpose and argument of this
thesis has not been to claim that every justice using a constitutional methodology is erroneous in
their application, nor that every decision in a case is a mistake. Rather, this thesis offers an
argument to demonstrate how the various constitutional methodologies utilized by Supreme
Court justices act as smoke screens for the subjective decisions being made underneath. This
thesis has not argued for one constitutional methodology over another, but instead has argued
that these methodologies all act as camouflage for the subjective decisions that justices must
make when analyzing and applying them to the Constitution.
Certainly, no correct or perfect constitutional methodology exists, despite how intently
constitutional theorists search, because the interpretation of the Constitution is always subjective.
Interpretation in and of itself is subjective due to the varying lenses used to view the world,
which are constructed by people’s personal values and experiences. Because of this, justices
should become more aware of the related flaws within their chosen methodologies, and the ways
in which these methodologies act as smoke screens. Justices should take a step back and analyze
how their subjective opinions and ideals are influencing their decisions. Perhaps, trying a new
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way of interpreting the Constitution or ceasing to use methodologies altogether is advisable.
Perhaps the absence of a methodology, which hides the real driving forces behind a justice’s
decision, would allow the justice’s subjective ideals regarding the question at hand to come to
the forefront and be properly dealt with. This would allow the justice to be completely aware of
introducing their personal views into the case and could help lessen the dangers of decisions
based solely on personal views.
It is somewhat dissatisfying to be unable to produce a solution to all the issues and flaws
of the constitutional methodologies. While the argument throughout this thesis has been that
these constitutional methodologies all act as smoke screens camouflaging the subjective
decisions that justices make when applying them, there presently seems to be no better option
than this. There is no alternative theory or process of interpretation that I can offer. The best way
to combat the myriad constitutional issues that come with attempting to interpret the Constitution
is to be aware of the flaws of the methodologies one employs and do the best one can to act
objectively and show restraint when possible while also being aware of the subjective decisions
they will inevitably need to make, or even to eliminate the use of these methodologies all
together. To paraphrase the words echoed by Wilkinson, justices are employing the best of the
worst constitutional theories available, which presently is the best that can be accomplished.
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